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CRIMINAL LAW
THE PERJURIOUS CLIENT QUESTION:
PUTTING CRIMINAL DEFENSE
LAWYERS BETWEEN A ROCK AND
A HARD PLACE
TERENCE F. MACCARTHY*
KATHY MORRIS MEJIA**
I.

INTRODUCTION

When criminal defense attomeys attend dinner parties, they invariably are asked the question: "How can you defend criminals you
know are guilty?" The lawyers have a multitude of ready, sometimes facile, sometimes heartfelt, and sometimes accurate answers
to that public question.' By contrast, an oft asked professional
question, but one which few, if any, criminal defense lawyers know
how to answer is: "Would you put your client on the stand if you
know he is going to lie?" No question has been more widely debated in legal literature, 2 yet left undecided. The real crime is,
* Executive Director, Federal Defender Program, N.D. Ill. J.D., DePaul University,
1960; A.B., St. Joseph's College, 1955.
** Ethics consultant, former staff attorney, Federal Defender Program, N.D. Ill. J.D.,
Northeastern University, 1975; B.A., University of Michigan, 1971.
1 Lawyers respond to the question, "How can you defend criminals you know are
guilty?" in a variety of ways, such as by saying: every accused person has a right to a
defense; the lawyer is not supposed to be the judge; no one is guilty unless and until the
prosecution proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; lawyers only defend innocent people, because all defendants are presumed innocent. Actually, the best and most accurate, if not entirely understood, response explains that guilty and not guilty (not
innocent) are for us legal and not moral terms.
2 Federal and state decisions on client perjury often catalogue the multitude of articles-written from varying perspectives-on the client perjury problem in the criminal
case. The list generally dates back nearly twenty years to the seminal article by Monroe
Freedman, ProfessionalResponsibility of the CriminalDefense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MicH. L. REv. 1469 (1966). See, e.g., Whiteside v. Scurr, 744 F.2d 1323, 1327
(8th Cir.), reh'gen banc denied, 750 F.2d 713 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. grantedsub nom. Nix v.
Whiteside, 105 S. Ct. 2318 (1985) ("This issue. . . has been extensively debated, but
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though, that the practitioners - the lawyers who actually represent
criminal defendants in criminal cases - are afraid to confront the
perjurious client question.3 Were they to do so, they would have to
look at the client sitting before them, who is entitled to their zealous
representation and to their effective assistance, and then divert their
eyes to their own license on the wall. Worst of all, were they to face
the question, they would be unable to find any real guidance from
those who draft and interpret ethical standards or from court opinions. The sorry fact is that, to date, there is no acceptable answer to
this most troubling of questions for the criminal defense attorney.
The difficult nature of the perjurious client question is, first,
that it requires criminal defense lawyers to seek to harmonize a
number of seemingly inconsistent aspects of the problem. These
aspects include: (1) the lawyers' ethical obligations to their clients
and to the courts; 4 (2) their clients' constitutional rights to due process of law, effective assistance of counsel, and to testify in their own
behalf;5 and (3) the lawyers' own personal interest in avoiding on
the one hand potential disciplinary difficulties from the bench and
by no means resolved, by several courts and many commentators.") (citations omitted);
Maddox v. State, 613 S.W.2d 275, 279- 80 (Tex. Grim. App. 1981) ("[Tlhe problem of
the perjurious defendant is one that has attracted the attention of a small army of courts
and commentators.") (citations omitted). Law review articles also continue, to date, to
list the cavalcade of legal periodicals covering the topic. See, e.g., Rotunda, The Notice of
Withdrawaland the New Model Rules of ProfessionalConduct: Blowing the Whistle and Waving the
Red Flag, 63 OR. L. REV. 455, 455-56 n.2 (1984) [hereinafter referred to as Rotunda,
Blowing the Whistle].
3 This Article is, in fact, about the perjurious client in the criminal case. It is not
about a mere suspicion or conjecture concerning the falsity of a client's testimony. Professional ethics requirements in this area relate only to the lawyer's knowledge of a client's
perjurious intentions or testimony. See Whiteside, 744 F.2d at 1328 and authorities cited
therein.
This Article also is not about perjury by witnesses other than criminal defendants.
The defendant in a criminal case holds a constitutional right to testify in his own behalf.
See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 93 n.1 (1977) (Burger, J., concurring); Whiteside,
744 F.2d at 1329-30 and cases cited therein. By contrast, because the lawyer is responsible for tactical decisions in the case, including which witnesses to call or refuse to call
to the stand, no collision occurs between the Constitution and the profession's ethical
requirements when non-client perjury is proposed.
The fact remains that practitioners are afraid to confront the perjurious client question. At a recent training session at The National College for Criminal Defense Lawyers,
the professional question inadvertently was raised before a group of approximately fifteen exceptionally experienced attorneys who were serving on the faculty. Only two
lawyers would look up, let alone suggest an answer; those two lawyers answered the
question-but their answers were diametrically opposed.
4 See infra text accompanying notes 11-57, discussing professional standards and
ethics opinions on the client perjury question.
5 See infra text accompanying notes 58-140, discussing federal and state decisions on
the client perjury question.
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bar, and on the other hand, malpractice suits by dissatisfied clients. 6
The second troubling problem in attempting this herculean task is
that criminal defense lawyers cannot possibly follow any of the current, and indeed conflicting, "solutions ' 7 to the criminal client perjury dilemma8 without incurring the ire of their clients, the courts,
their consciences, and/or their colleagues.
Unfortunately, the question of why the client perjury problem is
so difficult for the criminal defense attorney to resolve can be answered. The problem is difficult to resolve because most of those
who have attempted to divine the solutions, and there are many,
have failed to appreciate that there are major differences between a
criminal defendant and any other witness in any other case, civil or
criminal. 9
The civil trial lawyers allow that they have no problems with the
proscription against putting a perjurious witness on the stand. They
have a simple solution: simply do not call that witness to testify. As
a matter of fact, even criminal defense lawyers have no problem with
perjurious witnesses, except for the defendant. Like their civil counterparts, criminal lawyers simply do not call perjurious witnesses to testify. But the defendant in a criminal case is different, and here lies
the problem. The criminal defendant, unlike all other witnesses, has
a constitutional right to testify even over his or her attorney's strong
objection. 10
6 See infra, passim, regarding the consequences to the lawyers of the client perjury
dilemma.
7 See infra text and accompanying notes 11-57.
8 A decade ago, Monroe Freedman labelled perjury the criminal defense lawyer's
"trilemma-that is, the lawyer is required to know everything, to keep it in confidence,
and to reveal it to the court." M. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETmics IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM
28 (1975) [hereinafter cited as M. FREEDMAN].
9 See Nahstoll, The Lawyer's Allegiance: PrioritiesRegarding Confidentiality, 41 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 421, 439-40 (1984), in which the author observes: "inhere has been a
tendency to confuse and commingle the ethical problems attendant to criminal litigation
with those related to civil litigation. . . . Putting both cats in the same bag has produced a quite unmanageable snarl."
10 See supra note 3; Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 93 n.1 (1977) (Burger, J, concurring); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 n.15 (1975); Brooks v. Tennessee, 406
U.S. 605, 612 (1972); Whiteside, 744 F.2d at 1329-30; United States v. Bifield, 702 F.2d
342, 349 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 931 (1983); Alicea v. Gagnon, 675 F.2d 913, 923
(7th Cir. 1982). Cf United States v. Curtis, 742 F.2d 1070, 1076 (7th Cir. 1984) (defendant has constitutional right to testify truthfully in his own behalf, and counsel must
accede to defendant's exercise of that right). The Supreme Court has ruled that defendants must testify truthfully or suffer the consequences. United States v. Havens, 446
U.S. 620, 626 (1980) (defendant's testimony on cross-examination may be impeached by
government through use of illegally obtained evidence). The contemplated consequences in Havens were a perjury prosecution and evidentiary impeachment of the untruthful testimony, id. at 627, not the forfeiture of any and all constitutional rights.
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The relevant authorities thus have been grossly unfair in purporting to "guide" the criminal defense lawyer; and, the much
abused criminal defense bar is, concomitantly, most hesitant to do
what it is being told to do regarding client perjury, if indeed it can
discern what it is being told to do.
This Article documents both the conflict reflected within and
among the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, the ABA Standards on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility and the inconsistent interpretations of
those sources by the bar associations and courts. Finally, the authors propose a resolution that would give criminal lawyers the
power to confront the client perjury problem in a manner truly consistent with the interests of all concerned.
II.
A.

DISCUSSION

THE CONTRADICTIONS AMONG AND DEFICIENCIES OF THE SOURCES
OF THE ETHICAL DILEMMA

Tensions exist both within and among the various ethics approaches to the professional question of client perjury, particularly
with regard to the criminal case. To complicate the issue further,
the status in and among our many jurisdictions of the various
sources - the Model Code, 1 the Model Rules,' 2 and the ABA Standards on client perjury' 3 -is neither uniform nor always clear. 14 A
11 The ABA adopted the Model Code in August, 1969. The Model Code has been
amended over the years, most recently in 1980. The Code includes the Canons ("axiomatic norms"), Ethical Considerations ("aspirational in character"), and Disciplinary
Rules ("mandatory"). MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1979) preliminary statement [hereinafter referred to as MODEL CODE]. The Model Code has been
adopted by local rules of federal courts, see, e.g., In re Gopman, 531 F.2d 262, 265 (5th
Cir.), reh'g denied, 542 F.2d 575 (5th Cir. 1976) and in various forms by the states, see
codes of professional responsibility, state by state.
12 In August, 1983, the ABA replaced the Model Code with the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. The Rules and corresponding Comments were approved and
adopted by the ABA House of Delegates. The Rules and Comments, and certain proposed revisions of them, have been adopted in eight states (New Jersey, Arizona, Missouri, Delaware, Washington, Montana, Minnesota, and North Carolina) and are under
consideration for adoption in other states at the present time. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983) [hereinafter referred to as MODEL RULES].
13 STANDARDS RELATING TO THE DEFENSE FUNCTION [hereinafter referred to as ABA
STANDARDS] § 7.7 regarding defense counsel's obligation in the face of client perjury in
the criminal case, was approved by the ABA House of Delegates in 1971. Standard 7.7
was deleted from the approved draft in February, 1979. A revised version of the standard, ABA Project on STANDARDS FOR CRIMINALJUSTICE: THE DEFENSE FUNCTION [hereinafter referred to as ABA PROJECT, THE DEFENSE FUNCTION], Proposed Standard 4-7.7
(2d ed. 1980) was proposed to make explicit the prohibition against advising the court
of the lawyer's reason for seeking to withdraw. Id. at 95. The Proposed Standard, however, was withdrawn and was never formally submitted to the House of Delegates.
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brief review of each source, by no means an exhaustive or historical
coverage, illustrates the puzzling state of the so-called solutions to
the paramount ethical dilemma facing criminal defense attorneys.
1.

The Model Code of ProfessionalResponsibility

A number of Canons, Disciplinary Rules (DR) and Ethical Considerations (EC) speak or allude to the perjury problem. Canon 4
reads: "A Lawyer Should Preserve the Confidences and Secrets of a
Client."' 15 A corresponding Disciplinary Rule provides, in relevant
part: "Except when permitted under DR 4-101(C) 1 6 a lawyer shall
not knowingly: 1. Reveal a confidence or secret of his client. 2.
Use a confidence or secret of his client to the disadvantage of his
7
dient."'
Canon 7 states that "A Lawyer Should Represent a Client Zealously Within the Bounds of the Law."' 8 DR 7-101(A)(3) prohibits
the lawyer from intentionally prejudicing or damaging his client, except as required under DR 7-102(B). DR 7-102(B) requires a lawyer who "receives information clearly establishing that: (1) His
client has . . . perpetrated a fraud upon a tribunal . . ." to call
upon the client to rectify the fraud and, failing the client's rectification, to "reveal the fraud to the affected. . . tribunal, except when the
information is protected as a privileged communication." (emphasis added).' 9 DR 7-102(A)(4),(6) and (7), respectively, prohibit a lawyer
from
"[k]nowingly
us[ing]
perjured
testimony
"[p]articipat[ing] in the creation or preservation of evidence when
he knows or it is obvious that the evidence is false," and
"[c]ounsel[ing] or assist[ing] his client in conduct that the lawyer
knows to be illegal or fraudulent."
Two Ethical Considerations of Canon 7 also should be highlighted: EC 7-5 permits a lawyer to continue to represent a client
who wishes to proceed in a manner contrary to the lawyer's advice if
the lawyer "does not thereby knowingly assist the client to engage in
There is, thus, no ABA Criminal Justice Standard on this question, nor has there been
since early 1979.
14 See supra notes 10 and 11.
15 MODEL CODE Canon 4 (1980).
16 In pertinent part, DR 4-101(C) permits a lawyer to reveal: "(2) Confidences or
secrets when permitted under Disciplinary Rules or required by law or court order.
(3) The intention of his client to commit a crime and the information necessary to prevent the crime ..
" MODEL CODE DR 4-101(C)(2)(3).
17 Id. at DR 4-101(B). See, e.g., infra, text and accompanying notes 114-16, discussing
one such disadvantage to the client of attorney revelation of the defendant's perjury in
the criminal case.
18 MODEL CODE Canon 7.
19 The underscored language was added by amendment in February, 1974.
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illegal conduct ... ." EC 7-26 states that the law and the Disciplinary Rules prohibit perjured testimony and that "[a] lawyer who
knowingly participates in introduction of such testimony. . . is subject to discipline."
Thus, "the Model Code of Professional Responsibility is thoroughly confused on this issue."' 20 The complication under the Code
is that if a lawyer learns of his client's intended perjury from his
client, the lawyer cannot reveal the information, but he also cannot
participate in the presentation of perjured testimony. The Code
gives no guidance to the practitioner as to how to proceed. The
Code thereby leaves us with yet another question: To whom do lawyers owe paramount loyalty? Their clients, in seeking to maintain a
confidence? The tribunal, in seeking to prevent fraudulent conduct?
Themselves, in seeking to avoid discipline? The Code encapsulates
the inherent difficulty in resolving the client perjury question in the
criminal case. A recent commentator concluded, "The result is a
logical circle; but the end result is that client confidences must be
maintained, even though the lawyer's silence permits a client to
'2 1
commit perjury with impunity."
2.

The Model Rules of Professional Conduct

As if to compound the controversy, the more recently adopted
Model Rules favor disclosure of client perjury, yet the pertinent
Commentary questions the constitutional validity of such disclosure
in the criminal case. Importantly, the Commentary to the Model
Rules, unlike, for example, the Comments to the Standards, was
specifically adopted and approved by the ABA. A number of Rules
and Comments bear on the perjury question. For example, Rule
1.2, "Scope of Representation," requires a lawyer to abide by the
client's decision as to whether the client will testify, but prohibits
that lawyer from assisting a client in conduct "the lawyer knows is
criminal or fraudulent." 2 2 Rule 1.6,23 "Confidentiality of Informa20 Rotunda, Blowing The Whistle, supra note 2, at 456.
21 Vickrey, Tell It Only to the Judge: Disclosure of Client Confidences Under the ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, 80 N.D.L. REv. 261, 269 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Vickrey,

Tell It Only to theJudge].
22 See MODEL RULE 1.2(a) and (d). Under Rule 1.2(e) the lawyer is told to "consult
with the client regarding the relevant limitations on the lawyer's conduct." This provision has been referred to critically as "a lawyer-client Miranda warning." Freedman,
Lawyer-Client Confidences: The Model Rules' RadicalAssault on Tradition, 68 A.B.A.J. 428, 431

(1982).

23 MODEL RULE 1.6 on client confidentiality, and particularly Rule 1.6(b) permitting
but not requiring attorney disclosure of certain client crimes, has been the subject of
wide controversy and modification in the states. See, e.g., The Nat'l LawJ., Aug. 5, 1985,
at 8, cols. 1-3.
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tion," both precludes the revelation of "information relating to representation of a client" and exempts certain information from nondisclosure. The Comment to Rule 1.6, however, indicates that the
lawyer's duty under Rule 1.2(d) to refrain from knowingly assisting
a client in criminal or fraudulent conduct requires withdrawal from
the case under Rule 1.16(a)(1), 24 unless the court orders continued
representation. The Comment to Rule 1.6 also brings us to Model
Rule 3.3, "Candor Toward the Tribunal," the rule that speaks most
25
directly to the issue of client perjury.
Model Rule 3.3, in pertinent part, forbids a lawyer from knowingly "fail[ing] to disclose a material fact to a tribunal when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by
the client." 26 It also prohibits a lawyer from "offer[ing] evidence
that the lawyer knows to be false." 27 It expressly elevates the Model
Rule 3.3 duty to disclose perjury above the Model Rule 1.6 protection of client confidences. 28 The import of the language of Model
Rule 3.3, the primary Model Rule on perjury, is, then, that there is
no attorney-client privilege protecting the perjurious client.
Significantly, and in contrast, is the Comment to Rule 3.3, entitled "Perjury by a Criminal Defendant." The Comment states:
"While it is agreed that the lawyer should seek to persuade the client to refrain from perjurious testimony, there has been dispute
concerning the lawyer's duty [in a criminal case] when that persuasion fails." 29 The Comment proceeds to refer to counsel's three
24 MODEL RuLE 1.16(a)(1) and (c) require withdrawal, with court permission, if "the
representation will result in violation of the rules of professional conduct or other law."
Also note that the Comment to Rule 1.16 distinguishes between a client's demand and a
client's suggestion that the lawyer engage in illegal or unethical conduct.
25 Note also MODEL RuLE 8.4, "Misconduct," which condemns: a lawyer's violation
of the Model Rules or his knowing assistance to another to do so; the commission of a
criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty or fitness; the engagement in
dishonest, fraudulent, deceitful conduct, or conduct prejudicial to the administration of
justice. MODEL RuLE 8.4(a), (b), (c) & (d).
26 MODEL RULE 3.3(a)(2).
27 MODEL RULE 3.3(a)(4). The Rule also covers disclosure of falsities in material evidence that a lawyer learns of after the fact and extends the lawyer's duties of disclosure
to the "conclusion of the proceeding." MODEL RULE 3.3(a)(4),(b). This rule also permits a lawyer to "refuse to offer evidence that the lawyer reasonably believes is false."
MODEL RULE 3.3(c). It does not prescribe the manner in which the lawyer is to disclose
client perjury, or how the lawyer is to proceed if the court denies withdrawal from
representation.
28 See MODEL RULE 3.3(b). Accord Comment to Rule 1.6; see supra note 23 and accompanying text ("[A] lawyer has a duty under Rule 3.3(a)(4) not to use false evidence. This
duty is essentially a special instance of the duty prescribed in Rule 1.2(d) to avoid assisting a client in criminal or fraudulent conduct." MODEL RULE 1.6).
29 MODEL RULE 3.3 comment. The Comment also recognizes that "[w]ithdrawal
before trial may not be possible" for a variety of reasons. Id.
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choices: partial representation (the narrative),30 continued full representation,3 1 and disclosure of the perjury.3 2 The Comment favors
disclosure, yet in the following paragraph contains a caveat of constitutional proportion entitled "Constitutional Requirements:"
The general rule-that an advocate must disclose the existence of perjury with respect to a material fact, even that of a client - applies to
defense counsel in criminal cases, as well as in other instances. However, the definition of the lawyer's ethical duty in such a situation may
be qualified by constitutional provisions for due process and the right
to counsel in criminal cases. In some jurisdictions these provisions
have been construed to require that counsel present an accused as a
witness if the accused wishes to testify, even if counsel knows the testimony will be false. The obligation of the advocate under
these Rules
33
is subordinate to such a constitutional requirement.
In sum, the ABA Model Rules regarding client perjury build
more forcefully than does the Code toward requiring disclosure of
client perjury. Yet, the Model Rules Commentary to Rule 3.3,
which like the Rules themselves were specifically adopted by the
ABA, provides a coherent, constitutional basis for excluding the
criminal defense attorney from the duty to reveal intended or actual
perjury by his own client. The Commentary was and is an important
step forward in recognizing the impossible situation that faces criminal defense lawyers.
3.

ABA Standardsfor CriminalJustice: The Defense Function

Defense Function Standard 4-7.7, "Testimony by the Defendant," proposed an actual plan for dealing with client perjury in the
criminal case. To its credit, this was the first unequivocal attempt to
deal with the problem and give specific guidance to criminal defense
attorneys. The Standard required counsel first to "strongly discourage the defendant against taking the witness stand to testify perjuriously." 34

If, prior to trial, the defendant insists he will testify

perjuriously, the Standard permitted the lawyer to seek to withdraw,
if feasible, but stated that "the court should not be advised of the
lawyer's reason for seeking to do so." 35 Finally, if the lawyer finds
30 For further discussion of the narrative, see infra text accompanying notes 34-43,
128-134.
31 See, e.g., M. FREEDMAN, supra note 8, at 31, 40-41.
32 MODEL RULE 3.3 comment.
33 Id. Note that when Arizona adopted the Model Rules, it deleted the Rule 3.3
Comment, "Constitutional Requirements." By contrast, Washington actually incorporated the constitutional caveat into its version of Rule 3.3.
34 ABA PROJECT, THE DEFENSE FUNCTION Proposed Standard 4-7.7(a).
35 ABA PROJECT, THE DEFENSE FUNCTION Proposed Standard 4-7.7(b). It has been
noted that "with respect to withdrawal, the Standard ignores the fact that any judge
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himself at trial with the perjurious client, the Standard told him "it
is unprofessional conduct for the lawyer to lend aid to the perjury or
use the perjured testimony."3 6 Accordingly, when that testimony is
to be presented, the lawyer "should seek to avoid direct examination of the defendant in the conventional manner; instead, the lawyer should ask the defendant if he or she wishes to make any
additional statement concerning the case. . .. "37 Thus, the Standard proposed the use of the narrative3 8 direct examination of the
perjurious client in the criminal case. The Standard further prohibited the lawyer from arguing, reciting, or relying on the false testimony in closing argument.3 9
Though deserving of praise for its willingness to recognize and
specifically address this difficult issue, this Standard has been called
an "unsuccessful attempt to resolve the ethical issues created by cli-4o More importantly, several courts, including
ent perjury ....
three federal circuits, have in effect said that an attorney who follows
the direction of 7.7 would be rendering ineffective assistance of
41
counsel.
More intriguing than what Standard 7.7 said is the fact that it no
longer exists and has not existed in any form since early 1979.42
Ironically, however, it is still being cited by many attorneys and re43
lied upon by courts and commentators.
In sum, the Model Code, the newer Model Rules, and the exqualified to sit on the bench will know the reason for the withdrawal." Vickrey, Tell It
Only to theJudge, supra note 21, at 270.
36 ABA PROJECT, THE DEFENSE FUNCTION Proposed Standard 4-7.7(c). Sub-part (c)
also counsels the lawyer to "make a record of the fact that the defendant is taking the
stand against the advice of counsel in some appropriate manner without revealing the
fact to the court." Id.
37 Id. This procedure has met with criticism: "The lawyer is not permitted to reveal
expressly the fraud on the court; yet the lawyer's request to withdraw or his passive role
in direct examination are likely to alert the judge and jury that something is amiss."
Vickrey, Tell It Only to the Judge, supra note 21, at 270-71.
38 The Standard does not suggest what the next course of conduct is to be should the
prosecutor object to a narrative by the defendant. See M. FREEDMAN, supra note 8, at 37.
39 ABA STANDARD 7.7(c). For further discussion of the client's right to have his lawyer argue his case fully in closing, see infra note 147 and accompanying text.
40 Vickrey, Tell It Only to theJudge, supra note 21, at 269.
41 See discussions infra of the Whiteside, Lowery, and Wilcox cases from the Eighth,
Ninth and Third Circuits.
42 See Editorial Note to ABA PROJECT, THE DEFENSE FUNCTION Proposed Standard 47.7 explaining the withdrawal of the Standard; see also supra note 13.
43 See, e.g., United States v. Curtis, 742 F.2d 1070, 1076-77 n.4 (7th Cir. 1984); State
v. Fosnight, 235 Kan. 52, 56, 879 P.2d 174, 178 (1984); Comment, Proposed Client Pejury:
A CriminalDefense Attorney's Alternatives, 12 U. BALT. L. REv. 248, 254 n.47 (1983). Indeed, see infra note 129 and accompanying text regarding the recent contempt citation of
two lawyers who refused to proceed in a narrative fashion.
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tinct ABA Standard 7.7 are replete with references to the question
of client perjury in the criminal case. Yet, these sources, which each
conflict with the others and with themselves, are of little actual guidance in supplying the criminal defense attorney with a coherent,
concrete, workable resolution of the ethical dilemma of client perjury. The confusion comes full circle when the bar associations and,
even more importantly, the courts issue their opinions on the
subject.
4. Ethics Opinions
Two ABA ethics opinions directly address the client perjury
question. Not surprisingly, the two opinions conflict.
ABA Informal Opinion 1314 (March 25, 1975) states that when
a [criminal] lawyer knows in advance that a client will commit perjury at trial, the lawyer has a duty to advise the client that the lawyer
must either withdraw prior to the time the client testifies or report
the client's false testimony to the court. 44 Interestingly, the lawyer
may uphold the client confidentiality privilege, according to the Informal Opinion, only if the lawyer learns mid-trial of his client's
45
perjury.
ABA Formal Opinion 341 (September 30, 1975), although
somewhat unclear, essentially opines that confidences gained by
counsel from a client are protected by the attorney-client privilege
46
and may not ethically be revealed.
Note that these ABA opinions, like most of the state ethics
opinions, refer and relate to the Model Code of Professional Responsibility rather than the new Model Rules of Professional
Conduct.
Ethics opinions 47 across the nation also present a range of re44 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1314 (1975).
As a practical matter, if counsel is called upon to inform the court as to the reason for
withdrawal, counsel is left with no choice of action as contemplated by the Opinion. The
lawyer would have to move to withdraw and report the false testimony.
45 When counsel becomes aware, mid-trial, of his client's perjury, he is obliged under
ABA Informal Opinion 1314 to call upon the client to rectify the fraud and may withdraw if the client refuses. Accord ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility,
Informal Op. 1318. Parenthetically, the suggestion that counsel "may withdraw" is illusory. The only right counsel has is to move to withdraw, a motion which may be and
usually is denied by trial judges.
46 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 341.
47 Citations to these ethics opinions will be by locale, opinion number and date, if
any; summaries of the opinions can be found in the ABA/BNA Lawyers' Manual on
Professional Conduct in the Ethics Opinion section (801:1001 et seq.). The Manual provides information on where each locale's ethics opinions are published.
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sponses to the question of how to deal with the perjurious client. 48
Some bar associations require the lawyer to report the proposed
perjury; 4 9 others advise against reporting it if a confidential communication is the source of the lawyer's knowledge 5 ° or indicate that
only non-client perjury must be disclosed. 5 1 Other opinions pro52
hibit disclosure.
Similarly, some ethics opinions advise lawyers to withdraw without stating the reasons; 55 some say lawyers may, but need not, inform the court (and even the client's new counsel) of the reasons for
withdrawal; 54 others say lawyers may withdraw upon notifying the
court of the client's intent to commit perjury, but may not disclose
55
the reasons to their successors.
This brief sampling of ethics opinions reveals the lack of unanimity in the profession's interpretation and application of our supposed guiding standards. The courts often indicate that they need
not treat or reconcile the ethics precepts, 56 yet they often do employ
the Model Code, Model Rules, and the former, proposed ABA Standard 4-7.7 in their analyses. 5 7 The results in the courts are thus as
woefully lacking in clarity and consistency as the above-cited ethics
opinions. Indeed, the case law often illustrates the incompatibility
of the lawyers' duties to act ethically and yet to afford their clients
the constitutional rights and protections they deserve. The state of
the law is, at best, confusing and unclear. Yet, for some unexplained reason neither those concerned with lawyer ethics or defendant constitutional rights seem at all concerned with the lack of
direction given criminal defense attorneys or with the totally impossible position in which criminal defense lawyers are put.
48 Ethics opinions, similar to court decisions, more uniformly sanction the disclosure
of perjured testimony by witnesses other than the defendant. See, e.g., San Diego Cty.
Bar Assn. Op. 1983-8 (1983); Mich. Op. CI-63 (5/8/81).
49 E.g., Birmingham, Ala. Bar Assn. Op. 21 (10/8/82).
50 E.g., Ariz. Op. 80-27 (12/12/80).
51 San Diego Cty. Op. 1983-8; see supra note 48.
52 Los Angeles Cty. Bar Assn. Formal Op. 386 (undated); State Bar of California
Formal Op. 1983-74 (undated) (lawyer has duty to protect client's "secrets," including
testimonial perjury, though he may not rely on perjured testmony if his request to withdraw is denied).
53 N.C. Ethics Comm. Op. 362 (10/17/84); Iowa Op. 80-43 (1/19/81). See also opinions cited supra note 52.
54 E.g., Conn. Inf. Op. 82-11 (11/23/81).
55 E.g., Mich. Op. CI-692 (11/29/81).
56 See infra text accompanying notes 58-113, regarding judicial decisions on client
perjury that distinguish between ethical and constitutional considerations.
57 Id.
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CONFLICT AND CONCERN OF A CONSTITUTIONAL

DIMENSION

The preceding discussion reveals the variations in proposals for
dealing with client perjury: (1) avoid it but do not reveal a client's
confidence or secret; (2) disclose it and withdraw in most cases, but
perhaps not in the criminal case; (3) attempt to withdraw, giving no
reason for the withdrawal, but if you must proceed, substitute a narrative for direct examination and do not use the perjurious testimony in final argument; (4) continue with full representation and
disclose nothing to the court. The only base of agreement is that
the lawyer should try to dissuade the perjurious client from so testifying. In view of these profound discrepancies in approach, it is
easy to see why criminal defense attorneys do not know how to answer the client perjury question. The desire to be ethical does not
provide the solution; one first needs to know what being ethical in
this situation requires.
If the lawyers look to their usual source of guidance, the case
law, they unfortunately will find the same inadequate guidance that
they discovered by trying to work with the professional ethics manuals. The direction of the federal cases, however, seems to be that
the deprivation of constitutional rights is an impermissible consequence of a defendant's proposed perjury.
1.

The Whiteside Case

Most recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit decided, in Whiteside v. Scurr,58 that a defense attorney's pre-trial threat to his client to withdraw, to advise the state
court judge of his client's perjury5 9 and to testify in rebuttal against
his client if the client testified falsely at his own trial denied the defendant due process, the right to testify in his own defense, and the
effective assistance of counsel. 60 The court began its analysis of the
constitutional course a criminal defense attorney may pursue when
counsel believes the client intends to testify falsely by observing
that:
58 Whiteside, 744 F.2d 1323 (8th Cir. 1984).

59 There appears to be some question whether, under the facts, defendant Whiteside
was indeed a perjurious client. Briefly, the charge was murder; the theory of defense was
self-defense. Originally, the defendant told his lawyer he had seen no gun on the supposed aggressor. Shortly before trial, he told the lawyer he had seen something "metallic" in the victim's hand. The lawyer considered any proposed testimony by the
defendant about the metallic object to be perjurious. Id. at 1325-26. For the purposes
of this Article only, then, the testimony in question will be assumed to be perjurious, as
the Eighth Circuit so presumed it would have been. Id. at 1328.
60 Id. at 1328-29.
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[O]ur analysis does not deal with the ethical problem inherent in
appellant's claim. We are concerned only with the constitutional requirements of due process and effective assistance of counsel. As the
ABA Model Rule 3.3 comment, appendix B, states, the Constitution
prevails over rules of professional ethics, and a lawyer who does what
the sixth and fourteenth amendments command 6cannot
be charged
1
with violating any precepts of professional ethics.
Although the court "commended counsel for conscientiously attempting to address the problem of client perjury in a manner consistent with professional responsibility, ' 6 2 it agreed with the Ninth
Circuit 6 3 that there was "no escape, however, from the conclusion
that fundamental requisites of fair trial have been irretrievably
lost."64
Counsel's basic function in a criminal case is " 'to assist the defendant, and hence counsel owes the client a duty of loyalty, a duty to avoid conflicts
of interest.' "65 The Whiteside court thus held that counsel's actions in
the case before it "were inconsistent with the obligations of confidentiality and zealous advocacy."'6 6 Finally, the Whiteside court
ruled, "Counsel's actions improperly forced appellant in effect to
choose between two constitutional rights, the right to testify in one's
own defense and the right to effective assistance of counsel, and in67
fringed both."
The court in Whiteside stressed, and the authors agree, that a
court's "task is not at all to determine whether counsel behaved in
an ethical fashion," 68 but instead, to "determine what the Sixth
Amendment requires." 69 In doing so, the court considered, as
"guidelines and not as governing rules, the views of authorities on
7
legal ethics." 70 The court thus noted that counsel "fell short" '
under the "strict Freedman approach," 72 the ABA Defense Function
73
Standard 7.7 and the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct.
61 Id. at 1327.

Id. at 1327-28.
See Lowery v. Cardwell, 575 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1978). See also discussion of the
Lowery case infra, text accompanying notes 90-106.
64 Whiteside, 744 F.2d at 1328 (quoting Lowery v. Cardwell, 575 F.2d at 731).
65 Whiteside, 744 F.2d at 1329 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 104 S. Ct. 2052,
2065 (1984)) (emphasis added in Whiteside).
66 Id. The court stressed the need for the defendant to be able "to disclose information fully and in confidence to counsel." Id.
67 Id. at 1330 (citing United States ev rel. Wilcox v.Johnson, 555 F.2d 115, 120-21 (3d
Cir. 1977)). See infra text accompanying notes 107-111.
68 Whiteside, 744 F.2d at 1330.
62
63

69
70
71
72
73

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1330-31.
Id. See M. FREEDMAN, supra note 8, at 31, 40-41.
Whiteside, 744 F.2d at 1330.
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The court reversed and remanded, limiting its holding to the facts
of the case by ruling that a lawyer who threatens to testify against his
74
own client impermissibly becomes an adversary to that client.
Rehearing en banc was denied by a divided court of nine judges. 7 5
The case is currently pending before the United States Supreme
76
Court on a grant of certiorari.
The Eighth Circuit in Whiteside originally "expressed no view on
the Sixth Amendment implications of a lawyer's simply moving to
withdraw, with or without informing the trial court of the reason"
when faced with the perjurious client dilemma. 7 7 In the published
order denying rehearing en banc, however, the Eighth Circuit held
that:
a lawyer who has a firm factual basis for believing that his or her client
is about to commit perjury, because of confidential communications
the client has made to the lawyer, may not disclose the content of those confidentialcommunications to the trier offact, in the present case the jury. The
lawyer who discloses confidential communications or who threatens to do so has
departedfrom the role of an advocate and has become an adversary to the interests

of his or her client. Such a client has lost the effective assistance of counsel, a right to which even those defendants
who may later be accused
78
of perjury are entitled (emphasis added).
In his concurring opinion, ChiefJudge Lay advocated withdrawal by
the defense attorney faced with the perjurious client, but stated,
"Counsel should not, however, advise the court of his or her reason
79
for seeking withdrawal."
Four judges dissented, in two separate opinions, from denial of
rehearing en banc in Whiteside. Judge Gibson's dissenting opinion
commendably noted the need to consider counsel's dilemma, "particularly in view of the conflicting academic discussions of this question" 8 0 and because "It]he majority does not discuss the proper
course for the lawyer in the position faced by Whiteside's counsel,
which presents an extremely complex question." 8' The other dissent, authored by Judge Fagg, took issue with the Eighth Circuit's
original holding on the constitutional issue itself, ineffective assist74

Id.

75 Whiteside v. Scurr, 750 F.2d 713 (8th Cir. 1984).

Cert. grantedsub nom. Nix v. Whiteside, 105 S. Ct. 2318 (1985).
Whiteside, 744 F.2d at 1331.
Whiteside v. Scurr, 750 F.2d 713, 714.
79 Id. at 716-17 (Lay, C.J., concurring). Interestingly, the judge cites the withdrawn
ABA Proposed Standard 4-7.7. He also "recognize[s] that nonverbal acts may, in some
circumstances, inform the court that the client is intending to give false testimony." Id.
at 717 n.2 (discussing Lowery, 575 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1978)). See also infra text accompanyng notes 90-106.
80 Id. at 716 (Gibson, J., dissenting) (citing the Whiteside decision, 744 F.2d at 1327).
76
77
78

81 Id.
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ance of counsel.8 2 Judge Fagg relied on the Seventh Circuit decision in United States v. Curtis8 3 in which the court held that the
lawyer's refusal to allow his perjurious client to take the stand did
not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.
Interestingly, ChiefJudge Lay stated that he wrote his concur8' 4
rence "specially to address Judge Fagg's dissenting opinion.
Chief Judge Lay asserted that Judge Fagg "totally misreads the
holding of Whiteside v. Scurr,"8 5 and charged that "[h]is dissent is
certain to leave both lawyers and lay persons confused as to the
'8 6
breadth of the decision in this case."
A reading of the Whiteside decisions in and of themselves, let
alone the other federal and state cases on the subject of client perjury in the criminal case,8 7 leaves the criminal defense lawyer reeling. The decisions left unanswered the basic question of what a
lawyer should do if the lawyer's client persists in an intention to
commit perjury. If the lawyer chooses to withdraw from the case, he
or she could either give reasons for the withdrawal or refuse to give
reasons. The very refusal to give reasons, however, might flag the
court's attention, essentially informing it that the issue is one of client perjury. If the case is a bench trial, the problems caused by
withdrawal may be even greater. If the withdrawal motion is denied,
the attorney must choose between (a) continuing with full representation or (b) allowing the client to give the perjurious testimony in
narrative form and/or giving an abbreviated closing argument.
These issues, which the majority opinion observed were not necessary to the court's determination of the sixth amendment issue
before it, remain unanswered by the Whiteside case. Unfortunately,
the remaining authorities further illuminate, rather than eliminate,
the controversial incompatibility of constitutional rights and ethical
requirements.
2.

Related FederalAuthorities: ConstitutionalConstrictions and Collateral
Consequences of Disclosure of Client Perjury in the Criminal Case

The United States Supreme Court recently observed in Strickland v. Washington:
Representation of a criminal defendant entails certain basic duties.
Counsel's function is to assist the defendant, and hence counsel owes
Id. at 717-19 (Fagg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 719 (citing United States v. Curtis, 742 F.2d 1070 (7th Cir. 1984)).
Id. at 716 (Lay, C.J., concurring).
85 Id. (citing Whiteside, 744 F.2d 1323 (8th Cir. 1984)).
82
83
84

86

Id.

87

See infra text accompanying notes 88-140.
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the client a duty of loyalty, a duty to avoid conflicts of interest. (citation omitted). From counsel's function as assistant to the defendant
derives the overarching duty to advocate the defendant's cause
88

In the Whiteside case, the Eighth Circuit applied the Strickland standards in its ineffective assistance of counsel analysis and found that
counsel's threats were presumptively prejudicial to the defense. 8 9
The Whiteside case also built upon two federal circuit court
cases: Lowery v. Cardwell90 and United States ex rel. Wilcox v. Johnson.91
In Lowety, defense counsel formed the belief during a bench trial
that his client was testifying perjuriously. Counsel requested a re92
cess. At an in-chambers conference, in the defendant's absence,
counsel moved to withdraw; the court told counsel to state his reason, but counsel said he could not. The motion to withdraw was
denied. The trial resumed, counsel said he had no more questions
for the defendant, and counsel refrained from referring to the problematic testimony in closing argument. Obviously counsel attempted to follow the original ABA Standard 7.7.93 The Ninth
Circuit held that the defendant had been denied his due process
right to a fair trial. 94 The court condemned "such direct action as
we find here - the addressing of the court in pursuit of court order
granting leave to withdraw. [T]his conduct affirmatively and emphatically called the attention of the fact finder to the problem counsel was facing." 95 In so doing, counsel "disabled the fact finder
from judging the merits of the defendant's defense" 9 6 and "openly,
'9 7
placed himself in opposition to his client."
The Lowery court, like the Whiteside court, claimed that
"problems of ethics are not before us," 9 8 although it did refer in its
opinion to the ABA Model Code and Standard 7.7.99 The court
ruled that when counsel is surprised mid-trial by his client's perjury,
1 °
he "should not act to advance it,"
0 but is not required to with88 Strickland v. Washington, 104
89 Whiteside, 744 F.2d at 1328-30.

S. Ct. 2052, 2065 (1984).

90 575 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1978).
91 555 F.2d 115 (3d Cir. 1977).
92 The Ninth Circuit found no error in the proceeding in chambers without the defendant present. Lowery, 575 F.2d at 729.
93 See supra notes 34-43 and accompanying text.
94 Lowery, 575 F.2d at 730.
95 Id. at 731.
96 Id. at 730.
97 Id.

98 Id. at 731 n.6.
99 Id. at 730-31.
100 Id. at 731.
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draw. 0 1 Instead of "act[ing] in such a fashion as to disclose his
quandary to the fact finder,"' 0 2 the court stated he should "passively refuse to lend aid to what is believed to be perjury."' 0 3 ABA
Standard 7.7 (suggesting the narrative rendition by the perjurious
defendant) was in existence in May, 1978, when the Lowery court
spoke, but it was deleted from the Standards within months thereafter. 0 4 Notably, the court failed to explain how one "passively" refuses to "lend aid" and still satisfies sixth amendment obligations to
the client.
Judge Hufstedler specially concurred in Lowery. She found a
denial of defendant's sixth amendment right to effective assistance
of counsel when, by moving to withdraw, counsel "ceased to be an
active advocate of his client's interests."' 0 5 Her concurrence noted
that "no matter how commendable may have been counsel's motives, his interest in saving himself from potential violation of the
canons was adverse to his client, and the end product was his aban06
donment of a diligent defense."'
The holding in the Wilcox case, 10 7 the other federal case on
which the Whiteside court heavily relied, did rest on sixth amendment
grounds. The trial judge ruled that if defendant testified, counsel
would be permitted to withdraw and defendant would have to represent himself; the appellate court held that that ruling infringed upon
defendant's rights to testify 0 8 and to counsel. It appears that counsel in Wilcox actually did discuss the matter of client perjury with the
judge. 10 9 The Third Circuit, in dictum, called the disclosure issue
"an extremely complex question""10 and stated that "[wihen an attorney unnecessarily discloses the confidences of his client, he creates a chilling effect which inhibits the mutual trust and
independence necessary to effective representation.""'
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Id. See supra notes 35, 37-38 and accompanying text regarding the message that
passive representation is likely to send to the judge.
104 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
105 Lowery, 575 F.2d at 732 (Hufstedler, J., specially concurring).
106 Id.
107 United States ar rel Wilcox v. Johnson, 555 F.2d 115 (3d Cir. 1977).
108 But see United States v. Curtis, 742 F.2d 1070 (7th Cir. 1984) (counsel's refusal to
put perjurious client on stand not violation of defendant's right to testify truthfully in his
own behalf; ethical matter said not to be in issue, but court did cite ABA Proposed
Standard 4-7.7 which had been withdrawn for years). Id. at 1076-77 n.4. See supra note
13.
109 Wilcox, 555 F.2d at 117 n.5.
110 Id. at 122.
111 Id. The court concluded by observing that an attorney "may not volunteer a mere
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In sum, Lowery, Wilcox, and, more recently, Whiteside support the
conclusion that a criminal lawyer's subtle or direct disclosure of
client perjury to the trier of fact is adverse to the interests and constitutional rights of the defendant. 1 12 Where professional ethics
constraints may conflict, they should be tailored to conform to the
Constitution." 3 Perhaps these decisions then mean, as suggested
by the Comment to Model Rule 3.3, that the criminal lawyer no
longer will continue to be faced with the Hobson's choice that
caused reversals in Whiteside, Lowery, and Wilcox. If such is the case, it
is time to clearly and unequivocally instruct the criminal defense
lawyer as to how to constitutionally and ethically handle these
problems. Criminal lawyers and the administration of criminal justice have suffered enough at the hands of the client perjury
problem.
Finally, although not mentioned in perjury issue court opinions, the impermissible disclosure of client perjury in the criminal
case has very real and potentially severe consequences for the defendant, consequences not then apparent or considered by the
draftors of Standard 7.7. In 1978, in United States v. Grayson,'1 4 the
Supreme Court held that a trial court may consider its belief that a
defendant perjured himself at trial in determining, or more specifically, in increasing a defendant's sentence. Under Grayson,"1 5 trial
courts do indeed consider defendant perjury at sentencing, and ap1 16
pellate courts accordingly affirm.
The authors have no quarrel with the premise that perjurers,
assuming of course a "beyond a reasonable doubt" finding of such
perjury, should be punished. We do, however, lament the fact that
the attorney be required to disclose confidential information supporting client perjury to the court and thereby likely harm the lawyer's client who is convicted at trial. The lawyer's choice of "either
him or me" in the decision whether to disclose a client's perjury
unsubstantiated opinion that his client's protestations of innocence are perjured," id., as
counsel did in Wilcox. See supra note 3 regarding the definition of perjury.
112 Cf. United States v. Campbell, 616 F.2d 1151 (9th Cir. 1980) (judge should not be
told injury's presence that defendant is testifying against advice of counsel, but effective
assistance/fair trial not denied under circumstances of case).
113 Indeed, the dominance of the dictates of the Constitution over codes of conscience is supported by the Comment to MODEL RuLES Rule 3.3; see also Whiteside, 744
F.2d at 1327; see supra notes 33, 61 and accompanying text.
114 438 U.S. 41, 50 (1978).
115 See, e.g., United States v. Marshall, 519 F. Supp. 751, 755 (E.D. Wis. 1981), afr'd,
688 F.2d 82 (7th Cir. 1982).
116 United States v. Kimball, 741 F.2d 71, 75 (lst Cir. 1984); United States v. Terry,
702 F.2d 299 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Williams v. United States, 461 U.S. 931
(1983); Guippone v. United States, 464 U.S. 992 (1983).
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undoubtedly represents a classic conflict of interest. The courts
must aid the criminal defense attorneys in fulfilling their duty to
their clients, a duty most recently stressed by the Supreme Court in
Strickland, to avoid conflicts of interest. 1 17. If lawyers cannot avoid
the conflict because of unclear, unfair professional standards and
the courts' unwillingness to act decisively upon the incompatibility
of those standards with the constitutional rights of the criminal defendant, no solution to the perjurious client dilemma is in sight.
3. State Court Cases: Motion to Withdraw Denied; Passive
or Full Representation?
Certainly, an attorney can and should make every effort to dissuade the perjurious client from taking the witness stand in his own
defense. 1 18 In this regard, calling attention to the Grayson case and
its implications should be most helpful. Beyond that point, should
the client persist in his perjurious plans, great debate once again
arises, this time in state court cases, as to how to proceed.
The first issue centers on the substance of any motion to withdraw." 9 The Arizona and Colorado State Supreme Courts, in 1984
and 1981, respectively, decided that a motion to withdraw is permissible if counsel states no reason other than "irreconcilable conflict"
and refers to no provisions of the professional ethics code. 120 A
third high court, the Alaska Supreme Court, stated in 1980 that a
defense attorney "is not automatically correct" in revealing his cliStrickland v. Washington, 104 S. Ct. 2052; see supra text accompanying note 88.
See, e.g., Kirkham v. State, 632 S.W.2d 682, 685 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982) (not ineffective assistance of counsel for lawyer to discourage client from taking stand to perjure
himself).
119 Although withdrawal has been criticized for a number of tactical reasons, see, e.g.,
M. FREEDMAN, supra note 8, at 33-34 (i.e., even assuming the withdrawal motion is
granted, and the new attorney is ignorant of the perjury, the trial judge will still have
drawn the inference that the client is insisting upon perjuring himself), the authors believe that the lawyer faced with the client perjury dilemma should move to withdraw
without stating or alluding by words or acts to the basis for the motion. Criminal defense
lawyers move to withdraw for a number of reasons, such as a personality conflict with
the defendant, knowledge by an appointed attorney that a defendant does have, but did
not admit to, sufficient funds to retain counsel, a conflict of interest, a serious difference
of opinion regarding trial strategy, failure of the defendant to pay the attorney's fees,
schedule conflicts, etc. See, e.g., State v. Lee, 142 Ariz. 210, 220, 689 P.2d 153, 163
(1984) ("irreconcilable conflict" may mean a number of reasons other than conflict regarding perjurious testimony). Therefore, a motion to withdraw, in and of itself, is not
necessarily a cry of perjury to the court.
120 Lee, 142 Ariz. at 220, 689 P.2d at 163; People v. Schultheis, 638 P.2d 8 (Colo.
1981) (motion to withdraw due to defendant's insistence upon calling perjurious witnesses). See infra text accompanying notes 144-45 regarding extension of the "irreconcilable conflict" motion to perjurious client cases.
117

118
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ent's anticipated perjury to the trial judge.' 2 ' Two years later, the
Alaska Appellate Court reversed a conviction, ruling that counsel's
reference to "ethical problems" and specific ethics code provisions
essentially and impermissibly informed the judge that counsel's cli122
ent was going to perjure himself.
The nature of the withdrawal motion might be said to depend
on who is the trier of fact and the assessor of punishment in a case.
Three 1980 cases support this conclusion. In Butler v. United
States123 the District of Columbia Court of Appeals said that once
defense counsel told the court-the trier of fact in the case-of his
client's intention to commit perjury, the proceedings should have
been certified to another judge; the failure to do so deprived the
defendant of due process. 124 In Maddox v. State,125 a Texas court
said that although revelation to the finder of fact that a defendant is
testifying falsely "can deny due process," it is not necessarily error
to so apprise only the judge in a jury trial at which the jury also has
been elected to assess punishment; the attorney's motion to with126
draw did not deprive defendant of effective assistance of counsel.
t
27
In the New York case of People v. Salquerro, the court said that one
possible solution to the perjurious client problem is that counsel
should inform the court, in ajury trial, of a client's intention to commit perjury. But the Grayson problem still remains. In sum, lawyers
need guidance as to how, in fact, to move to withdraw-more gui121 Coleman v. State, 621 P.2d 869, 881 (Alaska 1980), cert.

denied, 454 U.S. 1090

(1981).
122 Newcomb v. State, 651 P.2d 1176 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982).
123 414 A.2d 844, 853 (D.C. 1980).
124 Id.

125 613 S.W.2d 275, 284 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
126 The court, in Maddox, succinctly summarized the client perjury problem when it
stated:
The problem of representing a defendant who insists on testifying falsely has
been called, correctly, one of the hardest questions a criminal defense lawyer faces.
The attorney is faced simultaneously with a duty to represent his client effectively, a
duty to protect his client's right to testify, a duty not to disclose the confidential
communications of his client, a duty to reveal fraud on the court, and a duty not to
knowingly use perjured testimony (as well as the possibility of criminal liability for
perjury). The difficulty is increased by the defendant's right to put the prosecution
to its burden of overcoming the presumption of innocence by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 'In practice,. . . the duties have come to be in perhaps uncontrollable conflict.' G.HAZARD, ETmics IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 129 (1978). Experienced

and conscientious people can come to different conclusions about the best way to
deal with the conflict. (Footnotes, citations omitted).
Maddox, 613 S.W.2d at 280. One wonders if the court's decision might have been different in light of Grayson if, as is usually the circumstance, the judge and not the jury had
the responsibility of imposing sentence.
127 107 Misc. 2d 155, 433 N.Y.S.2d 711 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980).
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dance than being told what is "not necessarily error" or what is
"one possible solution."
The next question is, of course, how should counsel proceed if
the motion to withdraw is denied. Certain recent cases continue to
advocate the use of a narrative and limited closing argument, relying
on the beleaguered, nonexistent ABA Standard 4-7.7.128 Indeed,
two appointed attorneys recently were held in contempt of court for
refusing to proceed in that manner. 129 These cases attempt to distinguish themselves from a case like Lowery v. Cardwell,13 0 or Butler v.
United States' 3 because the judges in them were not the triers of
fact.' 3 2 But if these state court "narrative cases" had been bench
trials, the use of the narrative device and the abridged closing argument might well have flagged the court's attention, unequivocally
signalling the judge that perjury was in progress.13 3 Even in a jury
trial, the passive representation method may create prejudice. Indeed, the Arizona Supreme Court recently noted in dictum that "a
knowledgeable judge or juror, alert to the ethical problems faced by
attorneys and the manner in which they traditionally are met might
infer that [the defendants'] testimonies were perjurious from trial
"134
counsel's failure to refer to them ....
The alternative solution is that of full representation. Commentators have advocated it, 13 5 and courts have condoned it. For example, in Coleman v. State,' 36 one of the few cases to recognize the
actual nonexistent status of ABA Standard 7.7,137 the trial judge ordered counsel to proceed with full representation of a defendant
whom counsel, in his motion to withdraw, had disclosed to be a perjurious client. Specifically, the judge directed counsel "to allow [the
128 See supra note 13 regarding deletion of ABA Standard 7.7 and non-submission,
non-approval of Proposed ABA Standard 4-7.7. But see, e.g., Fosnight, 235 Kan. 52, 679
P.2d 174; Salquerro, 107 Misc. 2d 155, 433 N.Y.S.2d 711 (approving of the Standard 7.7
narrative/abbreviated argument).
129 Matter of Goodwin, 279 S.C. 274, 277-78, 305 S.E.2d 578, 580 (1983) (counsel
claimed use of narrative procedure would deny defendant effective assistance of counsel
and refused to continue with trial; counsel held in contempt of court, but no sanctions
were warranted "this being an issue of novel impression").
130 575 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1978); see supra text accompanying notes 90-106.
131 414 A.2d 844 (D.C. 1980).
132 See Fosnight, 235 Kan. at 55-56, 679 P.2d at 181; Salquerro, 107 Misc. 2d at 160, 433
N.Y.S.2d at 715.
133 See supra notes 35, 37 and accompanying text, regarding criticism of the ABA Proposed Standard for the very reason that its procedures communicate the client's perjury
to the trier of fact-judge or jury.
134 Lee, 142 Ariz. at 219, 689 P.2d at 162 n.4.
135
136

See, e.g., M.

137

Id. at 881 n.21.

FREEDMAN,

supra note 8, at 31, 40-41.

621 P.2d 869, 878, 881-82 (Alaska 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1090 (1981).
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defendant] to testify, to question him on direct examination, and to
argue [his] version of the facts before the jury."' 138 The state
supreme court decided that no deprivation of a defendant's rights,
including the right to effective assistance of counsel, occurs when a
lawyer "is required to fully assist his client in presenting suspect
testimony."' 13

9

The review in this Article of the ethics opinions and legal decisions highlights one fact: a lack of consensus plagues the bar
associations and the courts concerning how a criminal defense attorney is to deal with client perjury. Unclear, resultingly, is whether,
and if so how, the disciplinary boards and the judicial system ought
to punish attorneys in this sensitive area.140
III.

RESOLUrION

The perjurious client problem is not runaway or rampant in
4
proportion to the total number of cases criminal lawyers handle.' '
It is, however, as this Article has tried to show, a serious and significant problem when it does occur. The ethics requirements and the
courts have put criminal defense lawyers between the proverbial
rock and the hard place: if they follow one Canon, they violate another; if they seek to protect themselves from disciplinary difficulties, they subject themselves to suits by their clients, render
ineffective assistance to defendants who can have their cases reversed, and ultimately undermine the sanctity of the attorney-client
relationship.
Again, no dilemma arises with regard to any witness other than
the criminal defendant himself. The refusal to place perjurious nonId. at 878.
Id. at 881. Note that the court stated it was not ruling that the trial judge should
always order "full representation" in such a situation, id. at 881-82, or "adopting this
approach generally," id. at 883 n.22.
140 Compare Attorney Grievance Comm'n of Md. v. Sperling, 296 Md. 558, 463 A.2d
868 (1983) (attorney publicly reprimanded for permitting client to give false, although
largely irrelevant testimony, in deposition; court emphasized non-criminal nature of the
underlying proceedings) with unpublished opinion in Board of Overseers v. Dineen, No.
Bar-83-46 (Me. Sup. Jud. Ct. 12/29/82), 1 Law. Man. Prof. Conduct 45, afd, No. 3594
(Me. Sup. Jud. Ct. 9/5/84), 1 Law. Man. Prof. Conduct 444 (criminal defense lawyer
who had previously been suspended for falsifying a record disbarred for knowingly offering client's perjured testimony rather than seeking to dissuade client or moving to
withdraw; lawyer so punished even though his knowledge of perjurious nature of the
testimony sprang from his client's admission to him that he had committed the crime).
141 Due to the fact that counsel must act only upon a "firm factual basis" for believing
that a client intends to commit perjury, Wilcox, 555 F.2d at 122, not upon mere conjecture, suspicion, or inconsistent statements by the defendant, "[iut will be a rare case in
which [the] factual requirement is met." Whiteside, 744 F.2d at 1328 and cases cited
therein.
138
139
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client witnesses on the stand is the lawyer's tactical right and ethical
responsibility. 4 2 When the criminal defendant, who has a constitutional right to testify, intends to testify falsely, however, then all of
the controversy and problems arise. If one is to accept the major
premise of this Article, something must and should be done to aid
the criminal defense attorney. A few suggestions follow.
First, the ethical pronouncements which unequivocally proscribe attorney-assisted perjury should make an exception where the
witness is a criminal defendant. This may well be what the ABA has
done in the adoption of the Commentary to Model Rule 3.3. This
exception is required not to give the defendant some advantage, for
as any experienced trial lawyer knows, perjured testimony almost
always hurts rather than helps a case - as well it should. This exception is required to acknowledge a criminal defendant's right to
14 s
testify and right to be fully and ably represented at trial.
Second, assuming a criminal defendant exception, the following
seems the most practical way to deal with an obviously bad situation:
a) The lawyer should seek as powerfully and persuasively as
possible to dissuade the client from taking the stand to perjure himself.' 44 Everybody agrees with this approach; it invades no constitu-

tional right, and it makes sense.
If all such efforts to dissuade fail:
b) The lawyer should move to withdraw, giving no reason(s),
other than "irreconcilable differences," "a conflict prevents me
from representing the defendant," or other similar, general phrasing of the motion. No ethics provisions or "professional dilemma"
should be mentioned, to avoid signalling the judge of the perjury
problem. There are today many reasons why a lawyer might move
142 See supra note 3. A lawyer's refusal to follow his client's desires regarding which
witnesses to call may cause discord, but that attorney-client problem does not reach the
same ethical/constitutional proportion as does the perjurious client problem.
143 Admittedly, should the courts, or more specifically the United States Supreme
Court, find, as either held or at least suggested by the Seventh Circuit in Curtis, 742 F.2d
at 1076-77, that a defendant is not entitled to these presumed basic constitutional rights,
then of course no exception is necessary.
144 A range of possible bases exists upon which to seek to dissuade a defendant from
testifying falsely: your proposed testimony is unlawful, your story will not stand up to
cross-examination; the details in your version can be shown by the prosecutor to be
false; if the judge thinks you are lying, he can increase any sentence you may receive.
The lawyer should tell the client he will have to move to withdraw if the client persists in
his perjurious intentions. The lawyer should not threaten to testify against his client, see
Whiteside, 744 F.2d 1323, nor should he threaten to disclose the client's perjury. The
authors view the latter threat to be as improper as the threat to testify which the court
condemned in Whiteside.
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to withdraw.1 4 5 The number of other reasons justify moving to
withdraw.
If the motion to withdraw is denied:
46
c) The lawyer should proceed to try the case like any other.
No narrative should be attempted; there is no major difference between putting a defendant on the stand and asking him to narrate
his testimony and occasionally interjecting "what happened
next?"' 14 7 The case may be argued in full, including the use of the
14 8
defendant's testimony if the lawyer deems it worthy of argument.
Most experienced defense lawyers probably would shy away from
arguing the perjurious testimony, not because of its perjurious nature, but rather because of the fear that the jury, no less the lawyer
himself, might break out laughing. Moreover, in closing, counsel's
argument usually takes the form of "you heard the witness testify
that" rather than the lawyer personally vouching for the truthfulness of that testimony. Indeed, the ABA itself acknowledges that it
is "unprofessional conduct" for a lawyer - prosecutor or defense
counsel - to "express [a] personal belief or opinion as to the truth
49
or falsity of any testimony in closing argument."'
Under this proposal, the judge may sentence the defendant
more harshly if he reasonably believes the defendant perjured himself, but the lawyer will not have confessed his own client to be a
145 See supra note 119. The authors agree with ChiefJudge Lay of the Eighth Circuit
that "[w]ithdrawal before trial, or when feasible, without advising the trial judge of the
particulars of the situation, normally will not constitute an 'unequivocal announcement'
depriving a defendant of his or her constitutional rights." Whiteside, 750 F.2d at 717 n.2
(Lay, CJ., concurring in denial of reh'g en banc).
146 Each lawyer is reminded to make a private record of the perjury (i.e., a letter
signed by lawyer and client and witnessed by fellow attorney) for use, if need be, in any
subsequent disciplinary or court proceeding.
147 Why go to all the trouble to avoid conveying the basis for the motion to withdraw,
then effectively scream perjury to the judge (and jury) by the classic use of the narrative
direct examination and limited closing argument procedure? See supra notes 37-38, 13234 and accompanying text.
148 Not only can perfunctory closing argument be ineffective assistance, Matthews v.
United States, 449 F.2d 985 (D.C. Cir. 1971); United States e rel. Wilcox v. Commonwealth, 273 F. Supp. 923 (E.D. Pa. 1967), aft'd sub nom. United States ex rel. Wilcox v.
Johnson, 555 F.2d 115, but a requirement that the lawyer avoid his client's testimony in
closing argument also may result in the pointing out of the perjury problem to the
judge. See supra note 133 and accompanying text. Whether to argue the client's version
should simply be a decision left to the lawyer's discretion and judgment. It may be that
the lawyer will find the tale too incredible, or even too humorous to argue. While the
prosecutor may think the defense lawyer highly ethical in refusing to argue what seems
to be perjurious testimony, counsel indeed may simply be acting highly practicably, in
the best interests of his client.
149 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINALJUSTICE: THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION, Standard 35.8(b); ABA PROJECT, THE DEFENSE FUNCTION Standard 4-7.8(b).
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perjurer. This proposed procedure will help, rather than harm the
criminal justice system. Without this procedure, counsel's role will
continue to erode: clients' deception of their lawyers will be
encouraged and open communication will be discouraged; two people who should work together at all times for the proper functioning
of the adversary system will, instead, be separated.
The only alternative to this proposal,' 50 if the disclosure, the
narrative, and the limited closing argument are generally approved
as the way to deal with client perjury, is to give criminal defense
lawyers the automatic right to opt out of the dilemma without signalling the court in any way: afford criminal defense lawyers the
absolute, automatic right to withdraw in any and every criminal case
involving client perjury.

150 Seeking to dissuade the client, moving to withdraw due to irreconcilable differences, and fully representing the client thereafter has been proposed by others, as well,
as the solution to the client perjury problem. See, e.g., Comment, Confidentiality and the
Lawyer's Conflicting Duty, 27 How. LJ. 329, 343-44 (1984).

